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Abstract
In Alaska, hunting permits are distributed by traditional lottery. The absence o f a preference point 
system means that applicants have little invested in their applications, and there are a variety o f fallback 
hunting opportunities. Not unlike a jackpot-style state lottery, the cost to play is low relative to the 
potential prize winnings. These factors may cause risk-averse or risk-neutral individuals to exhibit a 
preference for positive skewness in their bets. Analysis in this paper is focused on four prevalent game 
species: moose, dall sheep, mountain goat, and bison. Pooled Ordinary Least Squares regression models 
were constructed to predict permit application levels as a function o f various hunt characteristics, 
qualities, and restrictions. Permit descriptions are provided to applicants in a published document called 
the drawing supplement, which is the primary source of data for this study. Additional hunter-reported 
data is obtained from the Alaska Department o f Fish and Game website. A comparison o f calculated 
permit values and private ranch hunting opportunities validates many of the observations drawn from the 
models. Permit values are also used to fit a cubic model o f bettor utility. Even when awarded prizes are 
not monetary, applicants exhibit a preference for positive skewness and aversion from risk that is 
typically associated with gambling.
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1.0 Introduction
The purpose o f this study is to perform an analysis on the Alaska hunting permit lottery through 
two independent methods. The first is a development o f pooled OLS regression models that predict 
application levels for lottery-rationed hunting permits in Alaska. Dependent variables will focus on hunt 
quality and other hunt characteristics, as well as proxies for individual hunting expenditure, and factors 
related to likelihood of obtaining a particular permit. The second is an investigation o f gambling behavior 
among applicants in the lottery. Methods include nonparametric modeling o f expected utility, and fitting a 
cubic model o f applicant utility.
Big game hunting is a popular activity for recreation and as a method o f harvesting food. Hunters 
may participate either through general season or by obtaining specific hunting permits, which limit their 
activities by species, location, and season dates. In Alaska, most hunters pursue moose and caribou as 
important food sources, especially in remote areas of the state. Economic studies in the continental US 
have estimated the demand levels for various hunting permits using traditional econometric modeling 
methods. No similar analyses have been conducted for the State o f Alaska, which offers a large number of 
hunting permits through a lottery system. The distribution method also presents a unique opportunity to 
search for evidence o f applicant behavior that is often associated with gambling
Economists widely recognize the effect of diminishing marginal utility o f wealth on the 
marketplace, which dictates that bettors should avoid unfair bets and maximize expected outcomes. 
Friedman and Savage (1948) noted that bettors should decline bets with negative marginal returns, even 
though it is not observed in the marketplace [1]. Golec and Tamarkin (1998) and Garrett and Sobel 
(1999) conducted research on gambling behavior in the context o f horse racing and state lotteries. They 
too, noted that factors other than expected utility must influence the decision to play unfair bets [2], [3]. 
The value o f entertainment may be a partial explanation, but an observed preference for risk and/or 
skewness is best explained with a cubic model o f bettor utility. The structure o f the Alaska hunting permit 
lottery is unique because it does not use any equity-balancing tools that are common in other states.
Alaska hunting permits are distributed by traditional lottery and the data is publicly available, making it 
possible to evaluate the risk-preference behavior o f participants. Emphasis is placed on differences 
between game species and differences between Alaska resident vs nonresident hunters. Golec and 
Tamarkin (1998) suggested that individuals who place a series o f bets balance their wagers like a 
portfolio, maximizing utility and also preserving their chance to ‘win big’ on riskier bets. This betting
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strategy may be present in the permit lottery, with applicants mixing low-risk moose and bear permits 
with high-risk sheep, goat, and bison permits.
2.0 Background Information on Hunting Permit Distribution
Wildlife management policies differ greatly between states. In Alaska, regulatory agencies must 
rely on a variety o f mechanisms to facilitate the harvest o f big game. The predominate purpose of 
agencies such as the Alaska Department o f Fish and Game (ADFG) is to allocate natural resources for the 
public at sustainable levels and to promote economic prosperity for commercial sectors [4]. Maintaining 
sustainable levels of fish and wildlife generally means restricting harvest through limits, seasons, animal 
size, and gender restrictions. General season hunting is the simplest and most recognizable venue for 
hunters to harvest game. General season tags (nonresident) or harvest tags (resident) are available to 
hunters for purchase, or sometimes at no cost over the counter. Fee levels and the number o f distributed 
tags are determined by state agency or by federal agency in special cases. The number o f tags for an area 
or species is decided based on a wide array o f biological factors. Wildlife biologists’ survey and model 
wildlife populations to choose optimal level o f harvest from year to year. Issuing harvest tags allows 
management agencies to track the number o f hunters. Hunters are also required to report successful 
harvest o f big game animals for general season and permit hunts. This information is compiled and 
published electronically.
In some instances, the demand for big game tags is substantially greater than the supply and a 
different method o f tag distribution is required to ensure equity among participants. The most common 
method is a modified lottery sometimes referred to as a ‘preference point’ system. These systems are 
implemented in many of the continental U.S. states to distribute tags for specific hunting areas or species 
that are highly sought after. Tags are awarded to applicants with the most preference points in descending 
order until all tags have been distributed. Each year that an applicant is unsuccessful in drawing a tag they 
receive a preference point. The system is intended to distribute tags with a greater level of equity than a 
traditional lottery, and applicants who have applied for many years without success are rewarded for their 
persistence.
Tags in high demand are distributed by traditional lottery in Alaska, and are available to both 
residents and nonresidents. However, a separate system is in place to provide hunting opportunities for 
subsistence and personal use resident hunters. The Tier I and Tier II class permits are reserved
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specifically for Alaska residents and are issued when “there is not enough game for a general season and 
the population of animals has historically been an important source o f human food” [4]. Tier I hunting 
permits are provided when the resource is expected to allow harvest for all interested parties. Tier II 
hunting permits are awarded on a scoring basis and provides preference to individuals who have lived in 
Alaska the longest or who depend on the resource for survival and/or heritage. Tier II permits are used for 
game populations where the number o f interested parties greatly exceed the optimal target level. The 
Alaska Board o f Game approves tier I and Tier II allocations. These systems function independently from 
the traditional lottery.
The publicly available hunt supplement1 and reported harvest data2 are sufficient to construct a 
prediction model o f applications to each draw permit. Such a model could be valuable to management 
agencies in estimating the demand for prospective new or existing hunting permits. It may also 
demonstrate which particular hunt qualities explain the preferences o f hunters. Observations such as these 
could improve overall public benefit from the resource, especially considering the large number of 
applicant-restricted and method-of-take restricted permits. Permit demand is directly related to revenue 
through the collection o f application fees. A permit demand model could therefore be used to predict 
future revenue.
Each year, ADFG publishes a draw hunt supplement which lists the permits available for 
application [5]. The supplemental publication provides some information to hunters to aid them in the 
application process. Each hunt has a prescribed species, season, boundary, and other stipulations like 
weapon type or animal gender. Method-of-take restrictions are common and varied in the lottery.
Common method-of-take restrictions include bow only or muzzleloader only take. Other permits are 
restricted by qualities o f the applicant. This includes resident or nonresident only permits, as well as 
permits for youth and disabled veterans. ADFG also publishes harvest statistics like hunt participation and 
success rate online, and hunters can cross reference this data with the hunt supplement. Hunters have near 
perfect information about the quality and participation in permit hunting opportunities, as well as general 
season, Tier I and Tier II hunting opportunities. ‘Perfect knowledge’ implicitly includes travel costs and 
other expenditures related to hunt participation. The models assume the hunter knows how far they will 
need to travel and the approximate value of participating in the hunt.
ADFG received over 190,000 applications in the Nov. 2016 application period. A $5 to $10 
application fee is submitted with each application, depending on the species applied for. After the
1 ADFG drawing supplement http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?adfg=huntlicense.drawsupplements
2 ADFG hunter reported harvest statistics http://www.adfg.alaska.gov/index.cfm?adfg=moosehunting.harvest
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application period has closed, the winners are selected at random and the results are published online. 
Each year the number o f draw permits is adjusted for each hunt based on biological factors. If wildlife 
populations are too low, permit hunts can be eliminated. ADFG may also generate new draw permits if 
game populations or demand levels change dramatically. Applicants can file for up to 3 different hunt 
permits per species, with the exception of moose which can be applied for up to 6 times. Only one permit 
may be obtained for each species, and applicants list their applications in order of preference. An 
amendment to the policy later allowed applicants to apply for the same permit multiple times. This 
amendment took effect in the 2016 application period and affected observations are included in the 
constructed data sets.
3.0 Literature Review
Economic theory has helped to improve policy decisions regarding recreational hunting and 
fishing opportunities. One o f the earliest contributors to environmental and resource economics was 
Krutilla (1975), who formally described option values and existence values. He recognized the rapidly 
growing demand for natural resources. As a public good, recreational hunting opportunities must be 
limited by regulation to prevent over-allocation o f the natural resource [6]. Determining the sustainable 
level o f harvest has traditionally relied on biological science and methods. This style of management is 
effective for developing method-of-take restrictions such as size, gender, and season limits for harvest. 
The benefit o f a method-of-take restriction is that there is no limitation to who can participate. By 
restricting the method-of-take, management agencies reduce the level o f harvest without directly limiting 
participation. Population growth, particularly around urban centers, has rendered method-of take-methods 
practically ineffective. The level o f participation is so great that harvest levels exceed the sustainable level 
even when method-of-take restrictions are in place. In regions where demand for a resource substantially 
exceeds supply, management agencies restrict participation through permit application processes.
The innate problem with public goods is that marginal benefits decline dramatically with use.
This is especially true of a permit lottery, where application fees ($5-$10) are essentially zero compared 
to the utility gained from the harvest o f a big game animal. M umy andHanke (1975) described the issue 
mathematically using a simple cost-benefit analysis to model the choices of individuals. They 
demonstrate that the ‘zero-pricing case’ will always result in over allocation o f the resource [7]. The 
conclusion is dependent on assuming that resource quality is a function o f the level o f resource use, as 
described by Hardin (1968) [8]. After aggregating the resource demand, Mumy and Hanke (1975)
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illustrate that “the number o f demanded consumption units is always greater than capacity” [7] in the case 
where cost is zero. It is for this reason that access to resources with no cost or very low cost of use must 
be restricted. Fish and wildlife populations are actually far more fragile than the public infrastructure 
projects evaluated by Mumy and Hanke (1975). When the resource is overused it can become irreparably 
damaged, providing further incentive to restrict access.
When hunters travel to hunting areas they incur some cost from traveling. It represents the 
primary cost o f outdoor recreational activities in the form of expenditures on gasoline, automobiles and 
maintenance. Although there is other cost associated with hunting (eg equipment, opportunity costs) 
travel costs can be estimated or measured with some degree o f certainty. Boxall (1994) described the 
modified travel cost method (TCM). He used the modified TCM to model trophy antelope hunting in 
Alberta at eight particular hunting locations. Antelope permits were distributed to hunters through a 
traditional lottery and the hunting season was specific to each permit. The structure o f the lottery system 
was generally similar to the structure o f the Alaska hunting lottery. His model estimated application 
choices using multinomial logit regression. Travel costs in the model were estimated by measuring 
distance from the applicant’s zip code to the prescribed hunting area. A $/Km figure was applied to each 
distance to determine the cost to each hunter. In addition to the travel cost parameter, the model included 
“site characteristics or qualities... and characteristics o f the recreationists themselves” [9]. The model 
combined characteristics o f the hunt and characteristics o f the applicant.
A similar study was conducted by Scrogin Et al (2000) modeled demand for elk hunts in New 
Mexico over a 2 season time period. The focus o f the study was a policy change “intended to increase 
resident access to the hunts” [10] . Using the estimated demand, Scrogin E t al (2000) calculated changes 
in individual recreationist utility levels and net social welfare. Critical assumptions for their model are 
included here.
Assume that (a) applicants are randomly drawn in the lottery, (b) the supply o f  
licenses fo r  each hunt is fixed, (c) an individual can apply fo r  only one license, (d) 
licenses are nontransferable, (e) applicants are risk neutral and seek to maximize the 
expected (net) value ofparticipating, and (f) participants have fu l l  information about the 
characteristics and regulations o f  the various licenses to be issued and the total number 
o f  applicants fo r  each hunt. [10]
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Their model included a TCM price proxy variable very similar to that o f Boxall (1994). The base 
model includes indicator variables for various hunt restrictions, hunt quality, hunt region and unique 
qualities such as opening and closing weeks o f the season. Parts (e) and (f) are especially relevant to the 
analysis presented later in this paper. Accurate estimation o f the permit values depends heavily on the 
knowledge o f the applicant.
Scrogin et al (2000) model derived its methodology from Hellerstein (1993) which described the 
use o f count data and appropriate modeling distributions. Count data is unique in its occurrence and 
method of treatment. He explains, “price variation occurs across individuals, where each individual in the 
sample possesses a unique set o f unobservable factors. At any price, these factors (ceteris paribus) 
determine the quantity each individual consumes,” [11]. In the absence of individual level data there are 
some limitations to inference. Hunters have the opportunity to hunt whenever they want within the 
prescribed permit season. In most instances the hunting period is long enough that hunters may make 
multiple hunting trips. After each decision to hunt “the probability o f choice decreases proportionally, 
[and] this binomial distribution will asymptotically converge to a Poisson distribution,” [11].
Buschena et al (2001) modeled the distribution o f elk permits by a preference point system, with 
particular emphasis on policy implications. Their models controlled for typical hunt characteristics such 
as success rate, animal gender, weapon type, land access, time period o f the hunt, and the likelihood of 
harvesting a trophy animal. They estimated the number o f preference points needed to obtain a hunting 
permit, and used those estimates to calculate marginal permit values. By modeling permit values rather 
than expenditures or number o f hunting trips, they were able to comment on the effect o f changes to the 
structure o f the permitting process. For example, the study was able to compare the permit value of 
unrestricted permits to muzzleloader-only permits and make recommendations on how to increase the net 
public benefit o f harvested animals [12]. This method also creates an opportunity for management 
agencies to increase revenues by maximizing the number o f applicants, though this is typically not an 
agency goal.
The fundamental assumption o f lottery based permit distribution is that applicants are risk-neutral 
wealth maximizers. Nickerson (1990) elaborates on this assumption. He presents the certain value o f an 
application as a function o f income, price, household characteristics, and hunt parameters [13]. He 
assumes a positive marginal expected value when the applicant is drawn and a negative marginal 
expected value when the applicant is not drawn. The justification is intuitive. Nickerson explains;
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"A risk-neutral wealth maximizer is willing to participate in any lottery only i f  the 
expected value o f  the outcome is greater than or equal to zero. The rules allow  
participation in only one drawing and hence the individual will enter the drawing with 
the highest expected value. " [13]
Similarly, the number of applications for a particular permit will continue to increase as long as 
the expected marginal value o f applying is positive. Applicants will also apply to those hunts with the 
largest expected marginal value until the marginal values o f all permits are approximately equal. But 
lotteries involving cash prizes depend on players to purchase tickets when their expected outcome is 
negative. This is what makes the lottery profitable for the owner. Friedman and Savage (1948) noted the 
discrepancy between what traditional economic theory predicts and what is observed in the marketplace. 
The assumption of diminishing marginal utility dictates that for a lottery player, an earned dollar brings 
less utility than a dollar lost. Lottery players should therefore decline unfair bets, but this behavior is not 
seen in the real world [1].
Walther (2002) provides a qualitative explanation o f why risk-neutral or risk-averse individuals 
sometimes accept unfair bets. The most common and intuitive reason is that individuals derive utility 
from the act o f gambling. Walther describes the effect as a change in utility that arises from “the 
resolution o f uncertainty” [14]. In simpler terms, betting can be fun. The individual generates some utility 
as a product of simply playing the game, and experiencing elation or disappointment when the outcome of 
the bet is realized. This effect is well known to the public as the ‘Lottery Dream.’ The probability of 
winning a multi-million dollar lottery jackpot is dismally small, but lottery players derive utility from 
imagining or discussing their plans for the prize money. Walther explains why individuals are willing to 
forgo the cost to play.
‘Small probabilities to win are systematically overvalued. The reason is simple. I f  one loses with "certainty " 
no disappointment effect will arise. On the other hand, elation will be strong, i f  one gets a large gain -
against all odds.’ [14]
The ‘nothing to lose’ explanation may play an important role in hunting permit lotteries. There 
are striking parallels. The low cost o f applying and large number o f fallback hunting opportunities may 
allow applicants to rationalize applying to hunts that do not maximize their expected outcome. Clotfelter 
and Cook (1990) discuss alternative explanations for risk-loving behavior o f lottery players, and the
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demographic distribution of players. They found that low-income players were more strongly motivated 
by potential gains, and high-income players were more motivated by playing ‘for fun’. Typically lottery 
tickets cost around $1, and the expected payout is about half of the cost to play [15]. Utility gains from 
playing the lottery or the ‘dream’ effect must make up a portion o f that difference.
Golec and Tamarkin (1998) explore similar questions in the context o f horseracing. They too 
recognized the value o f  entertainment as a partial explanation to why bettors accept ‘overall negative 
returns’ after a day at the track. They improve upon their analyses with an empirical study o f bets placed. 
They suggest that betters want to maximize their expected outcome while also maintaining a chance to 
win big on a ‘long-shot.’ The tradeoff between negative expected return and skewness can be explained 
by a betting strategy that balances ‘favorites’ and ‘longshots’:
When Gamblers make their bets, they are considering the utility o f an evening’s 
outcome rather than the utility o f a single wager... O f course, they are more 
likely to lose part or all o f their stakes, but the possibility o f a large win is what
lures them. (pg 221) [2]
Garrett and Sobel (1999) expand upon the work o f Golec and Tamarkin (1998) by applying their 
reasoning and methodology to a wider population base. They examined state lottery data for similar 
evidence o f positive skewness preference. They estimate lottery player utility using a cubic utility 
function, and confirm previous findings. At high win probabilities, players tend to behave as risk-averse 
individuals. At low win probabilities, they tend to behave as risk-loving individuals [3]. Garrett and 
Sobel (1999) reiterate the observations o f Golec and Tamarkin (1998) and explain that large jackpot 
prizes seem to ‘entice’ players who are normally risk averse.
4.1 Application Model Data
The drawing supplement is organized primarily by game species, and secondarily by geographic 
location o f the listed hunts. Each hunt can be identified with a standardized hunt ID containing 5 
characters. Figure 1 contains the supplement listing o f a draw moose hunting permit in 2016, DM041 , as 
indicated by the first two digits DM. Hunts are listed by ascending ID, and there are significant gaps in 
the ID numbers. As hunts are altered, added, or removed they are assigned new hunt ID numbers. The ID
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numbers serve an important function in the organization o f the data set, which spans 6 years and 8 
species.
Gam e M anagement 
Unit, A rea
Hunt
No.
Num ber
of
Perm its
Season Dates 
2016 Lega l Moose
Specim ens 
Required (Return 
with permit report)
R eporting 
Requirem ents 
If S uccessfu l
Ad d itiona l Requirem ents and Inform ation
1C, Berners Bay
DM041 up to 5 Sept. 15-Oct. 15 Bull
i r f #
5-inch section 
of lower jaw 
with front teeth
In person or by 
mail to Douglas 
within 10 days 
o f kill
Hunt Area: Unit 1C within the Berners Bay drainages.
Figure 1: Example o f Moose Drawing Supplement Entry [5]
Table 1: Example o f Application Model Data
Hunt Num . Num.
ye a r  n e w  h unt species hunt
Num . A p p s  Perm its
0 if  e ith e r, 1 
if  bu ll, 2 if 
cow , 3 if
0 if  none, 1 if  
b ow , 2 if 
m uzzle, 3 i f  
shotgun, 4 if
antle rless, 4 0 i f  e ith e r, 1 if  yo u th , 5  if  1 2 
if  50inch bu ll res, 2 i f  n on and 3, 6  if  v e t
G M U  sub unit sex R es id ency Restric tions  srate
e xp e c ted  Concaten  
dra w  ated
41 DM041 723
The data set is constructed from the drawing supplement and is used to estimate predictive 
models for the permit lottery. It contains observations for the hunting permits offered from 2011-2016. 
Table 1 contains the application model data as derived from the supplement entry shown in Figure 1 . 
Table 1 also contains the success rate (srate) obtained from ADFG’s online database, and the number of 
received applications which is obtained from the 2017 drawing supplement.
7,13,14,15,20
2016 0 DM 5 1 0 0 80 1 1C
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Table 2: Summary Statistics o f Application Model Data
Species Observations
Min
Number
Apps
Max
Number
Apps
M ean
Number
Permits
M ean
Success
Rate
M ean Draw  
Probability
M oose 984 0 6267 29.1 39% 18%
Sheep 281 6 3341 10.4 41% 3%
G oat 221 15 1372 18.9 4280% 6%
Bison 34 363 14114 20.4 72% 0%
Elk 71 65 1042 53.9 33% 15%
M usk Ox 13 196 1586 18.1 99% 3%
Black Bear 56 1 266 39.5 40% 90%
Caribou 43 167 13597 146.4 56% 8%
Table 2 contains brief summary statistics for the application model data set. There are natural 
limitations in the abundance o f certain species, and therefore sustainable harvest levels. Regression 
modeling is restricted mainly to moose and Dall sheep permits. Most o f these hunts take place in 
relatively small hunt boundaries and are road accessible from Anchorage or Fairbanks, where most 
applicants reside. Hunting opportunities for these species are competitive and there are a sufficient 
number o f observations for each. For some other species, such as bison, there are only 4-6 observations 
per year. They are generally homogenous in terms o f hunt quality and other parameters, and model 
estimation is less reliable. The large number o f moose and sheep hunts, and their proximity to urban 
centers constrain the variation among the samples and allows the model to isolate the effects of estimated 
parameters. The data includes observations from 2011 to 2016, or 6 application periods [5].
There are some breaks in the data set due to structural changes and publishing gaps.3 The affected 
observations were dropped from the data set. The second main source o f breaks in the data is an inability 
to separate the effect o f restrictions on resident vs nonresident hunters. Approximately 30 moose hunts in
3 In 2014 there was a restructuring of moose hunts in unit 20, where several hunts were split to create permits 
available only to youth. In doing so, ADFG changed the ID numbers of 44 moose hunts from 2014 to 2015. The 
change resulted in a publishing gap the following year and the application levels for those 44 hunts are not known.
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units 21, 24 and 26 allow applications from residents and nonresidents, but there are separate hunting 
restrictions for the applicants.4
4.2 Application Model Methods
The model parameters not drawn from the hunt supplement are hunter reported success rate and 
approximate travel distance to the hunt Game Management Unit (GMU). Hunter reported success rate 
was obtained from the ADFG website harvest statistics. The travel distance term is estimated using a 
combination o f ArcMap analysis tools and Google Maps.5 Many hunters use ATV’s, snow-machines 
(snowmobiles), or boats to access hunting territory further from the highway. The models discussed later 
in the paper do not account for off-road vehicles, but the travel distance terms represent ordinal 
differences. Fairbanks was chosen as the travel distance origin because nearly all road-accessible permit 
hunts are located south o f Fairbanks. Although permit demand is driven by Anchorage residents, a 
distance term implies no directionality. A distance-from-Anchorage term would create ambiguity because 
there are hunt locations both north and south of Anchorage. A summary o f the variables used for analysis 
is presented in Table 3, below.
4 Nonresident hunters are required to take a large bull (minimum 50 inch spread or 4 brow tines) but residents may 
take any bull. The bigbull, bull, resident, and nonresident indicators are all important sources of inference in the 
model but their effect on the dependent variable cannot be isolated in these observations, so they are not included.
5Using ArcMap, The centroid of each game unit and subunit were generated and snapped to the nearest highway. 
The coordinates of the snapped points were exported to Google Maps and used to calculate a highway travel 
distance. A sum of the highway distance and distance from the snapped points to the appropriate GMU centroid 
were combined to form a total travel distance.
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Table 3: Application Model Variable Names and Descriptions
Variable Name Type Description
NumApps Continuous current year number of applications receieved
NumPermits Continuous published maximum number of permits to be distributed
srate Percentage previous year success rate of hunters who went hunting
y2011- 2016 Dichotomous indicator fo r years 2011 through 2016
resident Dichotomous 1 if an Alaska resident
nonresident Dichotomous 1 if not an Alaska resident
bow Dichotomous 1 if bowhunter certification to required
muzzle Dichotomous 1 if muzzleloader certification required
youth Dichotomous 1 if applicant must be 14 years of age or younger
vet Dichotomous 1 if applicant must be a disabled veteran
DFAIR Continuous calculated travel distance from Fairbanks to centroid of permit Game Management Unit
DANCH Continuous calculated travel distance from Anchorage to centroid of permit Game Management Unit
DFAIRsq Continuous squared Fairbanks travel distance
DANCHsq Continuous squared Anchorage travel distance
Moose specific
antlerless Dichotomous 1 if moose must not have antlers
bull Dichotomous 1 if moose must be male
bigbull Dichotomous 1 if moose must be male, w ith antler spread
sheep specific
fullcurl Dichotomous 1 if sheep horns must be full curl
g12, g7, g20 Dichotomous indicator variable fo r Game Management Unit
goat specific
remote Dichotomous 1 if no road access
southeast Dichotomous 1 if hunt Game Management Unit = 1,2,3,4 or 5
punish Dichotomous 1 if hunt punishes hunters who take nanny goat with kids
Travel cost is a significant expense for outdoor recreationists, and should be accounted for in the 
predictive models [16]. In the absence o f a travel cost term, a travel distance variable should be among the 
more significant parameters in the model. Nonresidents have substantially greater travel costs because 
they must first travel to either Anchorage or Fairbanks before traveling to their prescribed hunt area. 
Nonresidents also have greater costs if  they hire a hunting guide and/or pay for accommodations like 
hotel, rental car, etc. A hunting guide is required for nonresident hunters who pursue brown bear, dall 
sheep, or mountain goat. Theory would dictate that the resident and nonresident terms would capture 
these effects. In the absence o f individual level data, these indicator variables are the best method to 
account for travel costs for out of state hunters.
The data contains three sets o f categorical variables. The resident and nonresident indicator 
variable are compared to a baseline where either residents or nonresidents may apply. The remaining two 
variable sets both relate to hunt restrictions. One set contains dummy variables to indicate additional 
restrictions including bow only, muzzleloader only, youth only, and disabled veterans only. These 
restrictions should all limit the number o f prospective applicants and incur a negative effect on the
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dependent variable, apps. The remaining set varies for each species, but relates to animal gender or size 
restrictions. Together, these variables will attempt to capture preferences o f hunters. There is little theory 
to dictate expectations for these terms. However, the baseline is an either sex tag, which allows for the 
greatest flexibility in hunting strategy. Either-sex tags function similarly to antlerless tags, but stipulate 
that hunters may not take a female animal with young.
The draw hunt supplement used to compile the Alaska permit lottery data set does not contain 
individual demographic data or characteristics. This is a critical element of estimating demand 
relationships with count data, and was noted by both Boxall (1994) and Scrogin (2000). Count data for the 
Alaska permit lottery would ideally be modeled with a repeated discrete choice model. The permit 
rationing system modeling by Boxall (1994) and Scrogin (2000) closely resembles the Alaska hunting 
permit lottery. But in the absence o f individual characteristics o f the hunters and demographic 
information about applicants, modeling methods are limited to prediction-type Pooled OLS models. 
Equations 1 through 3 represent the generalized models with quadratic terms included for each o f the 
three modeled species.
Number of Applications Moose Permit P =  P 0 +  P 1XNum.Permits +  P 2XNewHunt +
P3XSRate +  P4XGenSeasSRate +  P5Xy2016 +  P6Xy2015+ P?Xy2014 +  P8Xy2013 +  P9Xy2012 +  Eq. 1
P10XBull +  PnX Antlerless +  P ^X B igB ull +  P^X R esident +  P^XNonResident +  P ^ X bow +
P16XMuzzle +  P nX Y outh  +  P ^ X y e t  +  P 19XDANCH +  P 20XDFAIR +  P21XNumPermitsSQ +
P22XSRateSQ +  P23XDANCHSQ +  P24XDFAIRSQ
Number of Applications Sheep Permit P =  P 0 +  P 1XNum.Permits +  P 2XSRate +
P3XGenSeasSRate +  P 4XDANCH +  P 5XDFAIR +  P6Xy2016+ P?Xy2015 +  P8Xy2014 +  P9Xy2013 +  Eq. 2
P10Xy2012 +  PnX R esident +  P12XNonResident +  PoX FullC url +  P14XAnySheep +  P15X bow +
P16XYouth +  PnXNumPermitsSQ +  P18XSRateSQ +  P 19XDANCHSQ +  P 20XDFAIRSQ +  P21Xg12 
+  P22Xg7 +  P23Xg20
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Number of Applications Goat Permit p =  P 0 +  P 1XNum.Permits +  P 2XNewHunt +
P3XSRate +  P4Xy2016 +  P5Xy2015 +  P6Xy2014+ P?Xy2013 +  P8Xy2012 +  P9XNonResident +  Eq. 3
P10Xpunish +  P 11XDANCH +  P 12XDFAIR +  P 13XNumPermitsSQ +  P14XSRateSQ +
P 15XDANCHSQ +  P 16XDFAIRSQ +  P17XSoutheast +  P18XRemote
4.3 Application Model Results
The travel distance proxy variables have some limitations in the model. The method of 
measurement does not account for travel costs incurred by the hunters and it approximates travel 
distances off the road system. However, the distance terms do capture ordinal preferences, which are 
sufficient for inference. Without individual data it is not possible to comment on individual demand or 
welfare changes in the lottery system.
Preliminary models are heavily influenced by heteroscedasticity in the data. Models for moose, 
sheep, and goat permits all tested positively for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test. Changes 
to the functional form o f the models improved the adjusted R-squared fit o f the model but created 
problems for inference. It is simpler to comment on permit demand in terms o f the number o f applications 
rather than percentage changes in applications. From a management perspective, it is also easier to 
estimate revenue changes for predicted application levels. Instead, the models are estimated with robust 
standard errors.
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Table 4: Application Models for Moose Permits Using Robust Standard Errors
A l a s k a  H u n t in g  P e r m it  L o t t e r y  -  Moose P e r m it s
B a s i c Q u a d r a t ! c Lind t e d
Huai. P e r a ic ts fi.6 fil***
(1.976)
15. B5 *** 
(1.09fi]
7.610***
11.973!
r .ev  h u n t 5. 764 
(L 3 T .fi)
-55.27
(143.9)
s r  a t e £ .E05L
(1.455)
4.460***
(9.931}
2.270*
{1.0521
GenSe a s S u c e e s s - 9 . 290 
( E . 553)
-1..153
(3.7471
j20L6 23B.6** 
(E 7 .41)
203.9***
(81.60}
263.2** 
1 3=3.56!
y2DL5 3E0.1***
(79.23)
395.3***
(67.211
340.7***
177.301
y2DL4 222.9**
(69.23)
204.4***
(5E.711
194.2**
171.35!
y2013 •3
1-)
•3
(-1
39.24 
155.EE!
y2012 -197.3
(5fi.30)
-92.01
(56.641
-E 4 .21 
151.191
b u l l -39 .43 ' 
(131.0)
-43.74
(113.1}
a n t l e r l e s s 343.4**
( 1 2 1 . 0 )
404.0***
(101.9)
675.1***
(107.01
higb'JLll -351..1
(202 .f i )
-24.00
(170.4I
r e s i d e n t 25B.0*
(133.9)
103 . f i
(125.0}
n o n r e s i d e n t 443.2**
(144.7)
-3 5 2 .3l 
(157.1}
-672.0***
(114.41
bow -377.6**
(L23.3)
- 3 6 3 . 3 * *
(120 .11
-3 3 3  . “3*** 
172.53!
nuiEEle -3 7 B .7* 
(154.1)
-377.5** 
( 14 fi . 11
-415.3**
1134.51
y o u th -4 2 E .4*** 
(106.0)
-30B.2**
(102.11
-333.7***
1E5.3E1
v e t -53E.1**
(L77.4)
-636.3  *** 
(143.91
-597.7*** 
135.51!
EAHCH - 2 . 931*** 
(0.410)
-L.473
(1..1511
DFAIR 0.5 fi7L*
(0.233)
6 .404L *^
( 1 . 1 1 9 )
10.33***
(1 .0211
HuaiPe rrrd t s s  q -0.0362***
(0.00664)
s r a t e s q -O.09496***
(0.00111)
EfiHCHsq - 0 .  000614 
(0.00170)
DfAIRsq -0.9104***
(0.00203)
-9.0157***
(0.00135!
C o n s t a n t 556.4
(305.4)
-433.3
(311.0}
-1.100.5***
1142.6!
Ob s e r v a t - i a r .s  
A d ju s t e d  P .- s q u a re d
7fi3
0 .5 I3
763
0.602
763 
0 .532
5tsr.ds.rd errors in. parentheses
* p K G . o s ,  * *  p < o . a i ,  * * *  p < 0 . a D i
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The moose permits pooled OLS cross section in Table 4 explains 52% of the variation in 
application levels for 763 observations. The number o f permits offered is highly significant, with each 
additional permit increasing the number o f applications by 6.7. Hunter reported success rate was included 
in the model to serve as a proxy for unobserved hunt qualities relating to specific geographic regions. We 
assume that hunters have perfect knowledge o f the areas they choose to hunt in and are able to compare 
the quality o f the available permits. Success rate is significant and each additional percentage point 
increases the number o f apps received by 2.9. The resident indicator is significant to the 10% level and 
the nonresident indicator is significant to the 5% level. They are compared to a baseline permit where 
either residents or nonresidents may apply. Weapon restrictions decrease the number o f applicants, as do 
youth-only and vet-only permits. Note that the year 2013 indicator is omitted in models that include the 
general season success rate variable. The general season success rate in 2013 and the base year 2013 are 
perfectly correlated.
Travel represents the primary cost component for hunters. The distance terms (distance from 
Anchorage and distance from Fairbanks) are highly significant to the pooled OLS model. The negative 
coefficient o f the ‘distance from Anchorage’ term is consistent with the expectation that permit demand is 
driven by Anchorage residents. As the largest city in Alaska, Anchorage’s residents comprise the largest 
portion of aggregate demand for hunting permits. With 298,000 residents, Anchorage makes up 40% of 
the state’s total population [17]. Because the travel distance terms do not imply directionality, inferences 
from models with the Fairbanks distance and Anchorage distance terms are unreliable. In the Limited 
model, application levels increase by 10.2 apps per mile o f distance away from Fairbanks. The quadratic 
term indicates an inflection point at a distance o f 307 miles from Fairbanks. Anchorage is approximately 
366 miles from Fairbanks by highway. At distances greater than 307 miles from Fairbanks, application 
levels will begin to decrease. The distance roughly corresponds with the length of the Parks Highway 
(323 miles), the primary route for travel between Anchorage/Matsu Valley and Fairbanks. At the relative 
maximum predicted by the Limited model, 3,166 applications will be received for any given moose hunt, 
ceteris paribus. The maximum dependent variable value in the data set is 6,267 applications.
In terms o f animal gender, we can make some interesting inferences. Antlerless moose permits 
receive an additional 343 applications over the baseline. Antlerless moose, although smaller, are more 
common and make better table fare than rutting bulls. For comparison, the large bull permit indicator was 
included. It is not significant to the model, and has a negative coefficient. If  hunters were pursuing trophy 
moose or hunting purely for sport, we would expect a positive and significant coefficient for the ‘bigbull’ 
term. It seems that antlerless permits are preferred to bull or trophy bull permits. This is not surprising 
considering moose are an important source o f food for many Alaskans. The finding is notable compared
16
to studies o f lotteries in the lower-48 states where demand for hunting permits is generally driven by 
trophy hunting opportunities for elk, pronghorn antelope, and other species [10].
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Table 5: Application Models for Dall Sheep Permits Using Robust Standard Errors
A la s L a  H u n t in g  Z er n i i t  l o t t e r y  -  E a l l  Sheep  P e m i t s
B a s i c Q u a d r a t ic A l t e r n a t e
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(G.2E41
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f u l l c u r l -5 .1 .7 3
(7 5 . 6 3 )
- 1 1 6 . 0
( 1 2 1 . 5 )
-.107 .3 **  
( 3 4 .0 6 ]
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youth. - 4 E 4 . 4
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The pooled OLS cross sectional model of dall sheep hunts in Table 5 explains 69.5% of the 
variation in application levels o f 242 observations. Each additional permit offered increases the number of 
received applications by 17.5. The Fairbanks distance term is less appropriate for the dall sheep model. 
Dall sheep live in steep mountainous terrain [18], and many o f the permit hunts can be accessed by 
multiple highway routes. Instead, an alternate set of dummy variables are developed from the ADFG 
designated Game Management Units (GMU). An alternate regional sheep permit model has an R-squared 
value o f 0.86. Sheep hunters exhibit a strong preference for hunts in GMU 12 and 7. An investigation of 
these permits reveals that easy road access to 4 specific hunts may be the motivating factor. Appendix F  
shows the hunt boundary for two particular sheep hunts (DS102 and DS103) in GMU 12, outside o f Tok, 
AK. State highways represent nearly 50% o f the hunt boundary perimeter, and applicants simply prefer 
hunts with the best access. Note that the year 2013 indicator is omitted in models that include the general 
season success rate variable. The general season success rate in 2013 and the base year 2013 are perfectly 
correlated.
An indicator for full-curl restricted hunts in the alternate model is significant to the 5% level and 
decreases the number o f applications by 107. We noted that antlerless moose hunts were preferred to bull 
hunts because it allowed for greater flexibility and likely relates to hunting for food. A similar 
relationship may be present in sheep hunters. Full curl rams are less common, and much harder to 
identify. Permit applicants may prefer an either-sex or any-ram permit to provide greater flexibility while 
hunting. If  a full curl ram is spotted, it can still be harvested within these broader tag categories.
Hunter reported success rate is not statistically significant in the model. The result is interesting 
because it illustrates differences in hunting strategy by species. Dall sheep are small animals compared to 
moose, giving little meat relative to the arduous hunting conditions that must be endured to harvest one. 
Sheep hunters may be motivated more by prestige than by subsistence. This may indicate a higher level of 
competition or risk preference among sheep hunters.
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Table 6: Application Models for Mountain Goat Permits Using Robust Standard Errors
Alaska Hunting Permit. Lottery - Mountain Goat Permits
Basic Quadratic Alternate
Num. Permits 1.461
(2.175)
23.12**
{7.163>
5.551**
(1.930)
new hunt -96.20 
(64.67)
-101 .5 
{95.29)
srate 1.43 6
(0.612)
6.469** 
{2.010)
y.2 016 -21.67 
(63.60)
-45.34
{61.55)
y 2 015 30.98
(93.20)
33.56 
{90.39)
150.4** 
(49.91)
y 2 014 10. 54 
(73.40)
31. 98 
{65.73)
y 2 013 -9.935 
(67.66)
-2.610 
{61.09)
y2012 -0.51-3 
(69.10)
-1 .291 
{64.47)
nonresident -575.2*** 
(76.92)
-396.9**'
{122.4)
-427.0*** 
(33.52)
punish -25.06
(65.30)
-29.39
{100.0)
-179.5***
(35.28)
DANCH -0.734* 
(0.317)
-2 .273 
{2.504)
DFAIP -0.820* 
(0.363)
7 .028** 
{2.401)
NuntPermi t s sq -0-657**
{0.203)
sratesq -0.0728** 
(0.0242)
QANCHsq 0.00694 
{0.00710)
IFAIPsq -0.00942*** 
{0 .00263)
southeast -271.4***
(60.09)
remote -194.0***
(46.71)
Constant 363.1***
(156.9)
-1156.7*
{517.2)
430.1***
(42.25)
■Qbs ervat ion s 
Adjusted P.-squared
130
0.101
130 
0. 312
214
0.233
Standard errors in parentheses
* p< 0.0 5, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.00
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A model o f mountain goat permits in Table 6 explains little o f the variation in applications, but 
provides valuable inference. Adjusted R-squared goodness o f fit ranges from 0.18 to 0.31 for the 
presented models. Similar to sheep permits, hunter reported success rate is not significant in the model. 
Mountain goats and dall sheep live in steep and rocky habitat, and hunting for mountain goat poses many 
of the same challenges. Success rate is often low. Also, note that there are no general season hunting 
opportunities for mountain goats in Alaska. Goat hunters have few substitute opportunities, so hunt 
quality is not relevant compared to other parameters. Applicants accept greater risk in order to pursue a 
rare quarry.
The dummy variable ‘punish’ represents a management tool for either-sex goat permits. A hunter 
may harvest a nanny goat, but the hunter will be prohibited from goat hunting for 5 years if the nanny has 
kids. This interesting stipulation is highly significant in the model. Permits with the punishment receive 
180 fewer applications in the Alternate model. Apparently, hunters are wary o f the possibility o f losing 
their hunting privileges.
5.1 Behavioral Model Data
The behavioral model data is constructed from the results document of the 2016 hunting permit 
lottery. It is used to test for gambling behavior in hunters, their permit bundles, and the tradeoff o f risk 
and expected utility among applicants. Table 7 contains data for three individual applicants, with their 
names removed for anonymity. The data indicates which permit was applied for, whether the applicant 
was drawn, and the applicant state o f residency.
Table 7: Example o f Behavioral Model Data
Year ^  Specier | D g y / N 0
First M idd le  Last Su ffix  C ity  State Zip  Cod°
2017 YM r616 No JU N EAU  AK 99801
2017 DM 871 No B R O O K H AVIN  MS 39601
2017 DC 485 No CHUGIAK AK 99567
An analysis o f risk behavior is conducted on the behavioral data set. Calculations and modeling 
are performed on a 10% sample o f the 2016 permit application results population, comprised of nearly
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160,000 observations [19]. The sample contains information for 3,698 individual applicants. The data 
include the hunt permit ID, applicant name, state code, zip code, and a yes/no field for successful 
applicants. Table 8 and Figure 2 represent the preferences o f applicants in the 10% sample by species.6 
Permit values are estimated for 455 unique permits. 44% of the unique permits are for moose, and 43% of 
the applications in the sample are for moose permits. O f the 3,698 applicants in the sample, 75% applied 
for at least 1 moose permit.
Table 8: Summary Statistics o f the 10% Behavioral Data Sample
Youth (<14 yrs old)
Alaska
Resident
Nonresident
Anchorage
Address
Fairbanks
Address
Count by Applications 203 15996 904 4044 1132
Percentage by Applications 1.20% 94.65% 5.35% 23.93% 6.70%
Count by Applicant 122 3349 369 813 275
Percentage by Applicant 3.30% 90.56% 9.98% 21.98% 7.44%
Moose Sheep Goat Bison Elk Musk Ox
Brown
Bear
Black
Bear
Caribou Count
Count by Applications 7208 2411 1439 1955 617 215 802 93 2160 16901
Percentage by Applications 42.65% 14.27% 8.51% 11.57% 3.65% 1.27% 4.75% 0.55% 12.78% ■ 1
Count by Applicant 2774 1069 743 1563 318 170 388 75 1720 3698
Percentage by Applicant 75.01% 28.91% 20.09% 42.27% 8.60% 4.60% 10.49% 2.03% 46.51% ■ 1
6 Additional summary statistics of the 10% sample can be found in Appendices B and C.
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Figure 2: Relative Participation o f Individuals in the Permit Lottery with Respect to Species
Although a large proportion o f hunters apply for caribou permits, inference from models is 
difficult considering the structure of the permit lottery. Caribou are an important source o f food in many 
rural communities and caribou management is unique. For example, the well-known Nelchina caribou 
herd contains about 40,000 animals at any given time and it represents a critical food source for residents 
of the Copper River Basin [20]. The number o f permits varies substantially each year, based on ADFG 
management goals and the size o f the herd. To further complicate the issue, Nelchina caribou permits are 
distributed by Tier I lottery, draw lottery, and by registration hunts. The complexity o f caribou hunting 
opportunities, and the inability to identify users o f different distribution channels makes caribou permit 
modeling prohibitively difficult.
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5.2 Permit Values Estimation and Validation
A risk-averse/wealth maximizing hunter should only apply if  their expected utility (a factor o f the 
probability o f receiving the permit, the probability o f a successful harvest, and utility gained from playing 
the lottery) is equal to or greater than the application fee. A procedure for generating permit values is 
shown in equation 4. The resulting estimates represent values that a hunter would pay for a permit given 
certainty o f obtaining the permit and harvesting the animal, with no gain in utility from the act o f 
obtaining the permit.
Fapp Vpermit * Pharvest * Pdraw > Vpermit Fapp/(Pharvest*Pdraw ) Eq. 4
Fapp = Application Fee
n Moose,Sheep,Goat,Elk,BrownBear,BlackBear -> $5 
D Bison,MuskOx -> $10 
Pharvest = Hunter Reported Success Rate During 2016 
Pdraw = Expected Permit Draw Probability (draw probability in 2015) 
Vperm it = Permit Value, 100% certainty o f harvest
The expected value o f each permit is then the permit value multiplied by the draw probability. 
Expected utilities are calculated for each permit using the Arrow-Pratt constant relative risk aversion 
utility function, where utility is a function only o f wealth (W) [21].
U(W)=ln(W) Eq. 5
The calculated permit values represent the dollar value an applicant would be willing to pay for a 
hunting permit, given a 100% chance o f being drawn and a 100% chance o f successfully harvesting the 
animal. The permit values do not reflect the cost o f guiding services, land access, or other amenities. 
Calculations are performed using equation 4. The permit values are presented in Figure 3. There is an 
asymptotic relationship between permit value and draw probability. A plot o f expected permit value by 
species is included in Appendix A .
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Permit Values by Species
•  Brown Bear
•  Caribou
•  Elk
•  Goat
•  Bison
•  Black Bear
•  Moose
•  Sheep
•  Musk Ox
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Figure 3: Permit Value over Draw Probability by Species for Behavioral Model Data
Moose and black bear permits make up the majority o f the low value/high probability hunts. 
Permits with a 100% draw probability are designated ‘undersubscribed,’ having fewer applicants than 
number o f available permits. The remaining permits are offered online on a first-come first-serve basis. 
Some moose and sheep hunts relied heavily on imputed values for hunter reported success rate, and a few 
undersubscribed hunts make up the small vertical trend at a draw probability o f 100%. The highest value 
permits are generally composed of bison and sheep hunts. These hunts are extremely competitive. Some 
bison hunts draw as many as 15,000 applicants each year, and successful applicants are prohibited from 
reapplying for 10 years.
American bison hunting opportunities are extremely limited, which provides an opportunity for 
comparison with private hunting ranches around the USA. Private hunting ranches provide the animal, 
land access, guide services, and accommodations to hunters with a 100% guarantee o f successful harvest. 
Their fee schedules are often available online. To compare these rates with the calculated permit values, 
we must compensate for land access fees, guide service costs, and overnight accommodations. One 
Alaska firm, Interior Alaska Guides and Outfitters, offers guided services to bison permit holders for a 
$3,400 fee. Although they do not guarantee their services, they claim a 100% bison harvest success rate 
with their clients. We assume an accommodations cost o f $200/day, and add land trespass fees where
5000 -  
4500 
4000 ^  
3500 -
aj a
.2 3000
(O
Draw Probability
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appropriate. We adjust the permit values and ranch fees to a standard 3 day/2 night hunt, and separate the 
hunts by animal gender and age. The values are listed in Table 9. We find that the adjusted permit values 
align surprisingly well with the private ranch hunting opportunities. In particular, the ‘DI403 bull only’ 
permit differs from the ‘ranch trophy-bull’ mean by only $24 (less than 1%).
Table 9: Comparison o f Adjusted Permit Values and Ranch Hunts for American Bison 7
bull - trophy net cost bull - young net cost
DI403 $ 7,016 DI403 $ 7,016
Oxranch Texas $ 7,500 Brown's Lodge & Hunting Ranch $ 7,000
Brown's Lodge & Hunting Ranch $ 8,000 Bearpaw Outfitters $ 4,250
Bearpaw Outfitters $ 7,250 Jim River Guide Service $ 5,100
Jim River Guide Service $ 6,100 EIA Outdoors $ 6,600
Moutain V iew  Ranch $ 7,700 Mountain V iew  Ranch $ 5,700
Alaska Interior Game Ranch $ 5,400 Alaska Interior Game Ranch $ 4,400
bull - trophy - mean $ 6,995 bull - young - mean $ 5,724
either sex net cost
DI450 $ 8,725 cow net cost
DI454 $ 6,980 DI404 $ 8,447
DI351 $ 6,262 Brown's Lodge & Hunting Ranch $ 6,000
DI352 $ 7,100 Bearpaw Outfitters $ 3,250
High Adventure Ranch $ 4,295 EIA Outdoors $ 5,600
The Bison Ranch $ 3,600 Mountain V iew  Ranch $ 4,700
Rockin 7 Ranch $ 7,150 Alaska Interior Game Ranch $ 3,600
either sex - mean $ 6,302 cow - mean $ 5,266
Summary of Means net cost
Draw Mean $ 7,172
Ranch Hunt - trophy bull - mean $ 6,992
Ranch Hunt - young bull - mean $ 5,508
Ranch Hunt - e ither - mean $ 5,015
Ranch Hunt - cow - mean $ 4,630
Overall Mean $ 5,863
7 Note that hunting permit DI403 specifies only that the animal be a bull, so it is included in the “trophy bull” and 
“young bull” categories for comparison.
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Overall, ranch hunting opportunities range in adjusted cost from $3,250 to $8,000. Adjusted 
permit values range from $6,262 to $8,725. Ranch hunts typically appeal to a ‘trophy hunting’ audience. 
Ranches often promote their lavish accommodations, gourmet meals, fully stocked bar, and the 
unparalleled size o f their animals. Mature bulls are in in high demand and prospective clients are 
encouraged to book their hunt well in advance. Sometimes the hunter will have chosen the exact animal 
they plan to harvest, months prior to the actual hunt. Not surprisingly, private ranch bulls fetch the highest 
price with younger ‘meat’ animals bringing gradually less based on size and gender. We observe that 
‘either sex’ and ‘cow only’ adjusted permit values are notably higher than their ranch-hunt substitutes.
The finding is not surprising, considering the known preference o f Alaskan hunters for high success rates 
and animals that make better table fare. Both o f these are likely true o f ‘either sex’ and ‘cow only’ 
permits. A comparison o f the mean values confirms this observation. We find that the adjusted permit 
value mean is only slightly higher than mean ranch hunt costs, at $7,172. The adjusted permit mean is 
heavily influenced by the value o f ‘either sex’ tags , which are offered in far greater numbers. The 
premium for Alaska bison hunting permits may also be explained by the higher cost o f living in Alaska, 
reflected in higher travel costs, retail good prices, and guide service fees. The analysis of the bison permit 
values provides validity to the calculation method described in equations 4 and 5.
5.3 Non-Parametric Evidence o f Gambling Behaviors
Nickerson (1990) explained that an applicant will apply to the hunt with ‘the highest expected 
value’ [13]. This assumption is not totally appropriate for modeling the Alaska permit lottery. The 
primary issue lies in the structure o f the lottery, which allows applicants to apply for multiple permits 
across 8 different big game species (though only 1 permit may be obtained for each species). Analysis 
must instead be focused on the expected value for a bundle of applications. Another complication arises 
when one considers the myriad o f substitutable hunting opportunities in Alaska. Hunters may be able to 
harvest an animal during the general season, by obtaining a Tier I or Tier II permit, or with assistance o f a 
professional guide. The unique structure o f the distribution system and immense variety o f hunting 
opportunities may not lead to wealth maximization o f lottery applicants; it may instead lead to gambling 
behaviors.
Garrett and Sobel (1999) demonstrated that state lottery players changed their behavior when the 
win odds and top prize varied. The same may be true o f hunting permits in unusually high demand. For 
example, wild bison hunting opportunities are extremely limited. This unique opportunity will attract up
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to 15,000 applicants for each Alaska permit. The estimated permit values are much greater for bison than 
for other species, and the corresponding draw probabilities are small. These “long-shot” type permits 
might entice applicants who normally behave as risk-averse individuals. Hunters may increase the 
likelihood o f being drawn by mixing high and low probability applications in their permit bundle. In a 
state lottery, players may purchase multiple tickets to increase their odds of winning. In the hunting 
permit lottery applicants may apply for up to 3 different permits per species (6 for moose). The key 
difference from a state lottery is that each unique hunting permit application has different win odds and 
expected utility. The cost to play is also low ($10 or less) relative to the potential gains. Hunters stand to 
lose very little, making the lottery seem even more like a betting game.
Non-parametric modeling methods are used to search for evidence o f gambling type behavior in 
the bundle o f Alaskan hunt lottery applications. The Alaska hunting permit lottery differs substantially 
from other hunting permit distribution methods and from typical state lotteries. There is no empirical 
standard for distributions to model the data. In order to fit curves for visualization and for economic 
inference, it is necessary to utilize a kernel density estimation (KDE) technique. However, there are 
natural limitations in the abundance o f certain species and therefore sustainable harvest levels. Due to the 
limited number o f observations in the other game species, KDE is restricted to moose, dall sheep, and 
mountain goats. Hunting opportunities for these species are competitive, and there are a sufficient number 
o f observations for each. For some other species, such as bison, there are only 4-6 observations per year. 
Any model will probably over-fit the data and inference will be limited. There are also some limitations to 
the hunter-reported data (success rate). For instance, a large number o f brown bear permits relied on 
imputed success rates to estimate permit values and a fitted model was not appropriate. Imputed values 
were calculated as an average o f up to five previous years o f reported data, when available.
In addition to the calculated permit values, a variable is generated to reflect the risk associated 
with unique permit bundles. Each permit within a bundle has an associated expected draw probability, as 
published in each year’s supplement. Multiplying the probability o f not winning each permit in the bundle 
results in a cumulative probability o f receiving no permits from the application bundle. This metric, 
probability o f  no permits drawn, reflects the risk o f the entire application, using existing information.
Pno perm its drawn = (1- Pdraw 1) * (1- Pdraw 2) * (1- Pdraw 3) ... *(1- Pdraw x) Eq. 6
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Using the Gaussian distribution and the normal reference bandwidth, plots are created for the 
expected utility bundles given the probability that the applicant obtains no permits.8 This metric is 
intended to reflect the relative risk o f unique permit bundles. An aversion to risk is inferred when the 
distribution is more positively skewed, corresponding to lower levels o f expected utility.
Figure 4: Fitted KDE for Full Application Expected Utility Bundles
In Figure 4 the full nonresident bundles exhibit far less positive skew than the resident only 
bundles. The same is true of the moose permit bundles in Figure 5. In the moose permit bundles the effect 
is actually far more pronounced. The nonresident-only plot appears relatively normal in shape. The 
willingness to accept lower expected utilities in Alaska residents is immediately apparent.
8 The ‘R Project for Statistical Computing’ offers a free software package for download on a variety of operating 
systems. The R function Density is used to fit the generated utility bundles. The from ’ and ‘to ’ options are used to 
limit the curves to the appropriate bounds (0 and 1 for a percentage).
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__ Gaussian KDE - Expected Utility of Application - Moose Permits
0 2 4 6  8
exp ected uti lity[eu=ln(w)*d rawp robability]
Figure 5: Fitted KDE for Expected Utility Bundles o f Moose Permits
As shown in Figure 6, the degree o f positive skew is far greater in both sheep and goat permit 
bundles than in moose permit bundles. There are far fewer o f these hunting permits offered, and substitute 
hunting opportunities are limited as well.
Gaussian KDE - Exnecteri Utility of Annlicatinn - Shesn Permits Gaussian KDE - Expected Utility o f Application - Goat Permits
0.0  0.5  1.0 1.5 0 1 2  3
expected utility [eu=ln(w)*drawprobability] expected utility [eu=ln(w)*drawprobability]
Figure 6: Fitted KDE for Expected Utility Bundles o f Sheep and Goat Permits
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Figures 7 through 9 are generated using the risk measure presented in equation 6. A preference 
for risk is inferred when the distribution is more negatively skewed, corresponding to higher probability 
that the applicant will draw none of the permits in their bundle. The differences in the plots o f the full 
application bundle are small. Risk preference does not seem to vary between residents and nonresidents at 
this level.
Gaussian KDE - Probability of No Permits Won - Permit Bundle
probability of no permits won
Figure 7: Fitted KDE - Probability o f Winning None of the Permits in the Full Application Bundle
In Figure 8 a bimodal distribution is again observed in moose permit application bundles. 
Separating the resident and nonresident applications yields some interesting results. Resident moose 
permit bundles are more positively skewed than nonresident moose permit bundles. Resident hunters 
accept higher levels of risk for moose permits in the lottery. The finding can be explained by two factors. 
First, there are more substitute moose hunting opportunities for resident hunters. If  an applicant is 
unsuccessful, they can easily hunt moose during the general season. This provides an opportunity for 
applicants to take an ‘all or nothing’ approach to their application strategy. Since resident hunters have 
little to lose, they are more likely to apply for high value moose hunts with the highest success rates and
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lowest travel costs. Nonresidents have substantially fewer opportunities to hunt moose. If  a nonresident 
hunter plans to take a moose in Alaska, they will need to pay for travel to the state and other costs like 
lodging, guide services, etc. They will likely prefer to maximize their chances o f obtaining a permit, since 
other opportunities are limited.
Gaussian KDE - Probability of No Permits Won ■ M oose Permits
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
probability o f no permits won
Gaussian KDE - Probability of No Permits Won - Moose Permits Gaussian KDE - Probability of No Permits Won - Moose Permits
probability of no permits won
probability of no permits won
Figure 8: Fitted KDE - Probability o f Winning None of the Permits in the Moose Application Bundle
In Figure 9 the distributions o f sheep and goat permit bundles are strongly skewed. The KDE’s 
for sheep and goat permit bundles are heavily skewed toward the upper bound. Moose are a better source 
of food than either dall sheep or mountain goats. It is likely that sheep and goat hunters seek trophy 
animals, or simply hunt for sport. This may influence the strategy o f the applicant. If  the animal is not 
needed for subsistence, the applicant may accept more risk in order to get a chance at a high value permit.
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Figure 9: Fitted KDE - Probability o f Winning None of the Permits in the Sheep and Goat Application 
Bundle
Bivariate KDE plots are generated with expected utility and probability of no permits drawn as 
the input variables.9 Contour lines on the plot represent the probability density o f the plotted points 
relative to the plot area. The area between any two contour lines represents 2% of the probability mass of 
the plotted points. Figure 10 shows some interesting differences in the application bundles o f residents vs 
nonresidents. Nonresident application bundles are less densely distributed. A greater proportion of 
nonresident hunters apply to low-return, low-risk permits than resident hunters. The differences between 
the plots are striking and conclusive. Nonresident hunters have larger expenses and opportunity costs 
associated with planning a hunting trip to Alaska. It is likely that they prefer to apply to permits with a 
higher level o f certainty that they will obtain at least one permit.
9 The MASS package contains the function kde2d which is used to compute bivariate kernel density estimates in R 
[22].
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Bivariate KDE ■ Perm it Bundle
0.0 0.2  0.4 0.6  0.8  1.0
probability of no permits won
probability of no permits won
probability of no permits won
Figure 10: Plots o f Bivariate KDE for Full Permit Bundle
Bivariate KDE plots o f the moose permit bundles exhibit a similar relationship. Figure 11 shows 
nonresident application bundles are more evenly distributed over the probability range. A larger 
proportion o f nonresidents prefer application bundles with a probability o f  no permits drawn less than 
40%. There is some overlap between the resident and nonresident bundles in the probability o f  no permits 
drawn range greater than 70%. The observed bimodality in permit bundles may be due to factors outside 
the scope o f this investigation. For example, there is no data on income for permit applicants. Household 
income probably has a significant effect on which hunts an individual can afford to participate in.
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Figure 11: Plots o f Bivariate KDE for Moose Permit Bundle
The nonparametric analyses seem to align with the observations o f Golec and Tamarkin in the 
context o f horserace betting. Applicants balance their application bundle with a mixture o f low 
probability/low return and high probability/high return permit applications. Bivariate plots o f sheep and 
goat permit bundles are included in Appendix D .
5.4 Fitted Cubic Applicant Utility Model
Friedman and Savage (1948) originally hypothesized that the aggregated utility curve o f bettors 
may take a cubic shape, explaining the risk aversion o f some players at higher win probabilities and risk 
loving behavior at lower win probabilities.10 Those players would “behave as if  they calculated and 
compared expected utility and as if  they knew the odds” [1]. Golec and Tamarkin (1998) and Garrett and 
Sobel (1999), used ordinary least squares regression (OLS) to fit a cubic utility function to horse racing
10 A figure of the cubic utility function from Golec and Tamarkin (1998) is included in Appendix E.
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bet payouts and lottery winnings. Golec and Tamarkin (1998) hypothesized that gamblers actually 
optimize the outcome o f a series o f bets over a day, rather than the outcome of singular wagers. Using a 
cubic utility model, Golec and Tamarkin (1998) demonstrate a preference for ‘long-shot’ bets on horses 
with low win probabilities. Risk-neutral or risk averse individuals should prefer betting on ‘favorites’, 
horses with higher win probabilities but lower expected mean returns. They propose that what bettors 
actually prefer is an increase in skewness over an increase in risk. Following their methodology, the 2016 
permit application results data can be fitted with a cubic utility model to test for gambling behavior. 
‘Favorites’ are represented by low risk moose, bear, and elk permit hunts. ‘Long-shots’ are synonymous 
to high risk permits for bison and some dall sheep. The general shape o f the cubic utility model is shown 
in appendix E . The model implies that at low draw probabilities applicants will behave as though they are 
risk loving. The convex portion o f the curve represents the risk loving range where applicants trade utility 
for positive skewness. The concave portion o f the curve represents the risk averse range, where applicants 
favor higher utility and decreased skewness.
First, an odds-ratio is generated for each unique permit by dividing the draw probability o f the of 
the highest payout bet by the draw probability o f the unique permit. In the case o f the hunting permit data, 
the highest valued permit (no adjustments) is a bison hunt (DI454) with a generated permit value of 
$4,725. Variables for squared permit value and cubic permit value are generated to represent the second 
and third moment o f bet returns. The three moment utility model represents coefficients for mean 
expected return, variance, and skewness. If the ‘long shot’ hypothesis holds true for the Alaska permit 
lottery data, we expect positive coefficients for the first and third moment and a negative coefficient for 
the second moment. The hypothesized result is interpreted as a preference for positive returns and 
skewness.
O d d s  R a t i o  ( P o /P g )  =  P 0 +  P 1X h  +  P 2X h 2 +  P3X h3 Eq. 7
E x p e c t e d  s ig n s  f o r  m o m e n t s :
( M e a n  o f  R e t u r n s )  P 1 > 0  
( V a r i a n c e )  P 2 < 0  
( S k e w n e s s )  P 3 > 0
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The regression models in Table 10 confirm the findings in literature. The dependent variables 
take on the expected signs with an inferred preference for positive returns and skewness, and an aversion 
for variance. Note that the magnitudes o f the estimated coefficients are much smaller than anything 
estimated by Golec and Tamarkin (1998) or Garrett and Sobel (1999). This is due to the smaller values of 
the awarded prizes/bet payouts and significantly larger win probabilities, both of which effect the odds 
ratio dependent variable.
Table 10: Fitted Cubic Utility Models for Bettor Utility by Permit Species
Alaska Hunting Permit Lottery - Fitted Cubic Bettor Utility
Odds Ratio All Permits Moose Permits Sheep Permits Goat Permits
Mean of Returns 0.000213***
(5.81)
0.000405***
(7.61)
0.000164 0.000286*** 
(0.49) (2.89)
Variance -4.89e-08* 
(-1.86)
-0.000000471***
(-4.17)
-3.Ole-08 -0.000000186 
(-0.12) (-1.62)
Skewness 9.25e-12**
(2.06)
2.13e-10*** 
(4.19)
1.08e-ll 5.91e-ll 
(0.25) (1.70)
Constant 0.00406
(0.47)
-0.0104*
(-1.81)
0.0310 -0.00650 
(0.27) (-0.37)
Observations 
Adjusted R-squared
278 
0. 637
110
0.781
33 33 
0.467 0.811
t statistics in parentheses 
*  p C O . 1 0 , * *  p < 0 . 0 5 ,  * * *  p < 0 . 0 1
The three moments o f the moose permit utility model are statistically significant to the 1% level. 
Hunters exhibit a strong preference for positive mean of returns and positive skewness in moose permits. 
Unsuccessful applicants can harvest a moose through the general season, but may have to spend more in 
terms o f travel expenses and opportunity costs. This is particularly true of resident hunters. With little to 
lose, hunters apply to moose hunts o f the highest quality and ease o f access. Naturally, these permits are 
highly sought after and are easily over-valued.
None o f the independent variables are statistically significant in the sheep permit model, and only 
mean of returns is significant in the goat permit model. Although the coefficients take on the expected 
sign, skewness is not significant in the cubic utility model including only sheep or goat permits. Sheep
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and goat hunting areas are geographically limited to the Alaska Range and the Brooks Range, 
constraining the variation in travel cost and hunter preferences. Because the hunting opportunities are so 
competitive, there is also little variation in the range o f draw probability. Moose permit draw probabilities 
range from 0.45% to 100%, but goat permit probabilities range from 0.5% to 21.3%. Similarly, Sheep 
permit draw probabilities range from 0.13% to 10.4%. A cubic utility model fails to represent the 
distribution o f sheep and goat permits because the observations represent a small portion o f the draw 
probability range.
6.0 Conclusions and Future Research
The three predictive models generally confirm the findings o f previous hunting permit lottery 
studies. Travel costs represent the primary expenditures o f hunters, and the number o f applications 
decreases as travel distance increases. Restrictions on weapon type or applicant characteristics (age, 
veteran status, state residency, etc.) also decrease application levels by reducing the eligible pool of 
applicants. Hunters are consistent in their preferences with regard to hunt quality, but hunting permit 
demand varies substantially with species and residency o f the applicant. Resident hunters are motivated to 
hunt for food, which influences their permit preferences. Nonresident hunters are more likely to pursue 
‘trophy’ animals, and hunt primarily for sport. Additional information like applicant income could be 
used to search for additional evidence o f what motivates hunters. Improvements could also be made to the 
pooled OLS models by incorporating a variable to account for the season/dates o f the hunting permit. 
However, there is little basis for comparison between permits. The hunt dates span throughout the fall and 
winter, and vary in length. An indicator variable for opening month o f the hunt would be an appropriate 
starting place. Duration o f season may also be useful.
It may be valuable from a policy standpoint to determine what motivates lottery applicants. It 
may be possible to increase lottery revenues and/or public benefit from the lottery. Further research is 
necessary to demonstrate what motivates applicants. One potential solution would be to compare the 
calculated permit values with auctioned permits. Nonprofit organizations may submit requests to the 
Alaska Department of Fish and Game for hunting permits. These permits are auctioned at charity events 
to the highest bidder.
Kernel density estimation is an excellent technique for analysis when data has no known 
empirical distribution and no foundations in literature. In the case of this paper, it proved instrumental in
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generating a variety o f plots for economic inference. Current methods to test for risk-preference behavior 
rely on parametric methods. In this paper, a non-parametric method of analysis for risk-preference 
behavior is based on skewness o f expected utility and the net probability o f a loss. ‘Skewness’ is poorly 
defined in literature, and there are several measures used to quantify it. Future research in this area may 
benefit from testing other characteristics o f a probability density function. Kurtosis, for example, is a 
measure o f lateral density in the probability density function. It is influenced less by the position of the 
mean and median than a skewness coefficient, and may reveal more significant differences in the data 
plots.
In the case of the hunting permit lottery data, analysis may benefit from a boundary-corrected 
KDE. Because the estimated parameter probability o f  no permits drawn is bounded at 0 and 1, it may be 
more appropriate to use a boundary-corrected KDE over a Gaussian KDE. This method may help to 
preserve the relative position o f the mean and median in the data. It may also be helpful to demonstrate 
risk-preference behavior through a third variable. Multivariate KDE functions are available in several R- 
packages. Rather than testing the properties o f distributions, it may be easier to demonstrate a multivariate 
relationship to some other variable that indicates risk-preference. Additional data would have to be 
collected to pursue these avenues.
In general, applicants do not maximize their expected outcomes. Applicants accept lower 
expected returns and higher probabilities that they will obtain no permits. The effect is more pronounced 
in sheep and goat permits than in the unaltered application bundle. The observed differences in individual 
species plots and the full utility bundle plot show some evidence o f the ‘portfolio’ approach to balancing 
return and risk. Where possible, we expect applicants to choose to apply for permits with the greatest 
expected outcome and lowest risk. The work o f Golec and Tamarkin (1998) suggests that when 
individuals are presented with a range o f bets they often choose a combination that maximizes expected 
utility while also preserving their chance to ‘win big’.
Alaska’s permit distribution is unique, primarily because there are so many hunting opportunities 
outside o f the permit lottery. Although other US states distribute hunting permits by lottery, few do so 
without the aid of some equity-balancing tool such as preference points. In the absence of a preference 
point system, applicants stand to lose only their application fee ($5-$10 per application). With very little 
invested in the application process and a large number o f substitute hunting opportunities, it seems likely 
that lottery applicants would exhibit stronger gambling behaviors. The primary evidence o f this comes 
from an observed proclivity for low draw probability/high permit value hunts. When a hunter does not 
draw any permits, they can still harvest moose, sheep, black bear, brown bear, and caribou during the 
general season. The moose pooled cross section revealed a preference for antlerless moose and permits
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with higher success probabilities. For most resident hunters, the primary purpose o f hunting is for 
recreation and for food. Bivariate KDE’s demonstrated that resident hunters accept a higher level o f risk 
than nonresident hunters, probably due to substitute opportunities and lower travel costs. The fitted cubic 
utility models demonstrate that even when the awarded prize has a relatively small value (compared to a 
jackpot type state lottery), participants are risk-averse but prefer a ‘positive skewness o f returns’ [3]. 
Following the methodology of Golec and Tamarkin (1998) and Garrett and Sobel (1999), the analysis 
reveals that bettors behave similarly, even when the awarded prize is not monetary.
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Appendix B: P r o p o r t i o n a l  A p p l i c a t i o n  B r e a k d o w n  o f  1 0 %  B e h a v i o r a l  M o d e l  D a t a  b y  S p e c i e s  
Species Proportions of Application Sample
■ Moose ■ Sheep ■ Goat
■ Bison ■ Elk ■ Musk Ox
■ Brown Bear ■ Black Bear ■ Caribou
Species Proportions of Unique
■ Moose ■ Sheep ■ Goat
■ Bison " Elk " Musk Ox
■ Brown Bear ■ Black Bear ■ Caribou
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Appendix C: L o t t e r y  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  A p p l i c a n t s  b y  S p e c i e s  a n d  F r e q u e n c y  o f  I n d i c a t o r  
V a r i a b l e s
Participation of Applicants by Permit Species
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Bivariate KDE - Sheep Permits
Appendix D: Plots of Bivariate KDE for Sheep and Goat Permit Bundles
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Appendix E: G o l e c  a n d  T a m a r k i n ’ s I l l u s t r a t e d  S h a p e  o f  C u b i c  B e t t o r  U t i l i t y  F u n c t i o n
Utility
High Pg Low Pg
Source: [3] pg 89
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Appendix F: ADFG Dall Sheep Hunt GMU Map
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